Gedam Kamalakar Senior Fellow ICSSR, Department of Political Science, Osmania University, Hyderabad, Telangana, India
Address for correspondence: Gedam Kamalakar, Senior Fellow ICSSR, Department of Political Science, Osmania University, Hyderabad, Telangana, India E-mail: kamalakarou@gmail.com
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Journal of Global Public Health
8(1):p 25-30, January-June 2026. | DOI: na
How Cite This Article:
Gedam Kamalakar. Revisiting Electoral Reforms in India: Insights from the High-Level Committee on One Nation, One Election. Jr of Glob Pub Hea. 2026; 8(1): 25–30.
Timeline
Received : February 16, 2026
Accepted : March 17, 2026
Published : June 30, 2026
Abstract
The proposal of One Nation, One Election (ONOE) has re-emerged as a significant electoral reform debate in India, aiming to synchronize elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies. This paper revisits the idea through the lens of the High-Level Committee on One Nation, One Election chaired by Ram Nath Kovind. Drawing on the Committee’s report, constitutional provisions, and comparative democratic practices, the study critically examines the rationale, feasibility, and implications of implementing simultaneous elections in India’s federal polity. The paper argues that while ONOE promises administrative efficiency, cost reduction, and policy continuity by minimizing the frequency of elections and the repeated enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct, it also raises serious constitutional, political, and democratic concerns. These include challenges to federalism, the autonomy of states, the principle of representative accountability, and the risk of centralization of political power. By engaging with the Committee’s recommendations, stakeholder responses, and judicial interpretations, the paper highlights the need for broad political consensus, constitutional amendments, and institutional safeguards. The study concludes that electoral reforms such as ONOE must balance efficiency with democratic pluralism, ensuring that reforms strengthen rather than dilute India’s democratic foundations.
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Data Sharing Statement
There are no additional data available. All raw data and code are available upon request.
Funding
This research received no funding.
Author Contributions
All authors contributed significantly to the work and approve its publication.
Ethics Declaration
This article does not involve any human or animal subjects, and therefore does not require ethics approval.
Acknowledgements
We would like to express our gratitude to the patients, their families, and all those who have contributed to this study.
Conflicts of Interest
No conflicts of interest in this work.
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Cite this article
Gedam Kamalakar. Revisiting Electoral Reforms in India: Insights from the High-Level Committee on One Nation, One Election. Jr of Glob Pub Hea. 2026; 8(1): 25–30.
This license enables
reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium
or format for noncommercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is
given to the creator.
This license enables
reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium
or format for noncommercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is
given to the creator.